Published 28 February 2025, The Daily Tribune
Jurisprudence is clear that utterances made in the course of judicial or administrative proceedings belong to the class of communications that are absolutely privileged regardless of the defamatory tenor and the presence of malice. The only test is that such utterances were relevant, pertinent, or material to the cause in hand or subject of the inquiry.[1] This privilege was even extended to utterances or statements made during a preliminary investigation as such proceeding was a preliminary step leading to judicial action.[2] Would such privilege extend to quasi-judicial proceedings?
The above issue was finally settled in the recent case of Arquiza v. People.[3] The case stemmed from a Petition to Deny Due Course or Cancel the Certificate of Nomination (Petition) filed before the Commission on Elections (COMELEC) by Godofredo V. Arquiza (Arquiza) against Francisco G. Datol, Jr. (Datol), a party-list nominee to Congress. Due to the statements in the Petition allegedly imputing a crime upon Datol, Arquiza was charged with the crime of libel.
The Supreme Court eventually ruled that “statements made in quasi-judicial proceedings are absolutely privileged, subject to certain requirements.” It further laid down the four-fold test to determine whether to apply absolute privilege to statements made in the course of quasi-judicial proceedings, or in steps necessarily preliminary thereto.
(1) Quasi-judicial powers test. Was the document containing the alleged defamatory statement filed or submitted as a necessarily preliminary step to or during a quasi-judicial proceeding?
By its very nature, the petition to deny due course or to cancel a certificate of nomination of party-list nominees calls for the exercise of COMELEC’s quasi-judicial functions.
(2) Safeguards test: Does the proceeding afford procedural protections similar to those provided by the judicial process?
While the Petition would call for a proceeding which is summary in nature, procedural protections such as due notice and hearing, opportunity to controvert the charges, and submission of evidence are not dispensed with.
(3) Relevancy test. Was the alleged defamatory statement relevant and pertinent to such proceeding?
The allegedly defamatory statements made in the Petition certainly pass the test of relevancy considering that they are the very grounds relied upon to cause the denial or cancellation of the certificate of nomination
(4) Non-publication test. Was the document containing the alleged defamatory statement communicated by the author only to those who have a duty to perform with respect to it and to those legally required to be served a copy thereof?
When a person sends a communication to an office/officer which/who has a duty to perform with respect to the subject matter of the communication, such communication does not amount to publication.[4] Based on records, only the pertinent government office and parties were furnished copies of the Petition.
Considering that the four-fold test was satisfied, the Supreme Court acquitted Arquiza of libel.
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[1] See Mali vs. People, 199 Phil. 532 (1982) and Navarrete vs. Court of Appeals (2000) cited in Arquiza v. People, G.R. No. 261627, 13 November 2024.
[2] See Alcantara vs. Ponce, 545 Phil. 677 cited in Arquiza v. People, G.R. No. 261627, 13 November 2024.
[3] G.R. No. 261627, 13 November 2024.
[4] Alcantara vs. Ponce, 545 Phil. 677.683 cited in Arquiza v. People, G.R. No. 261627, 13 November 2024.
